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This article examines the historical record of the Austro-Hungarian
monetary union, focusing on its bargaining dimension. As a result of the
 Compromise, Austria and Hungary shared a common currency,
although they were fiscally sovereign and independent entities. By using
repeated threats to quit, Hungary succeeded in obtaining more than
proportional control and forcing the common central bank into a policy
that was very favourable to it. Using insights from public economics, this
article explains the reasons for this outcome. Because Hungary would have
been able to secure quite good conditions for itself had it broken apart,
Austria had to provide its counterpart with incentives to stay on board. I
conclude that the eventual split of Hungary after World War I was
therefore not ‘written on the wall’ in , since the Austro-Hungarian
monetary union was quite profitable to Hungarians.
This Austro-Hungarian political feeling was an entity so curiously constructed that it
seems almost useless to try to explain it to someone who has not experienced it. It
was not made of a Hungarian part and an Austrian part which would have, as one
might have thought, completed each other, but indeed of a part and of a whole, that is, of
one Hungarian feeling and of one Austro-Hungarian, the latter being at home in Austria,
so that Austrian citizens had properly speaking no homeland. Austrians therefore only
existed in Hungary, and even there, only as an object of aversion; at home they called
themselves citizens-of-the-kingdoms-and-lands-of-the-Austro-Hungarian-monarchy-
represented-at-the-Imperial-Council, which amounted to saying ‘one Austrian plus
one Hungarian minus that very same Hungarian’; and they did so less out of
enthusiasm than for the sake of an idea they disliked, since they could not stand the
Hungarians more than the Hungarians could stand them, which further complicated
the matter.
Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, 
Except perhaps for Sissi, the Habsburg dual monarchy, over the course
of its last half-century of existence, has never been too popular. Novelist
Robert Musil’s famous mockeries on ‘Cacania’ (as he nicknamed the defunct
Empire) are still in our minds: but his jokes merely followed a venerable
tradition, dating back to such writers as Elyse´e Reclus who had defined
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the monarchy as ‘political chaos complicated with bureaucratic fancy’.
The Romantic nineteenth century had had sympathies with the nationalist
uprisings that followed the French Revolution and its principle of self-
determination. One must side with the French at Valmy, with the Italians
at Magenta. Can one resist siding with Hungary, another victim of Austria?
The Talmud says that even if it is the Just who tyrannise the Unjust, God is
with the Unjust. What else can we do?
For modern European economic historians, there are two reasons to
take the standard interpretation of the dual monarchy with a grain of salt.
The first has to do with being Europeans: one century of exacerbated
nationalism has led us to accord ‘nations’ less respect. We find virtues in
the creation of cosmopolitan institutions if they can be conducive of peace
and prosperity: Cacania has merits. The second reason has to do with being
economic historians. Cliometrics, with its arsenal of data, hypotheses and
counterfactuals, is especially well endowed to determine the economic logic
that consciously (or, since Vienna is involved, unconsciously) presided over
political arrangements.
This article thus deals with the Austro-Hungarian ‘Compromise’ of 
in the period before World War I. The Compromise was a constitutional
treaty that secured fiscal sovereignty for Hungary. It had been obtained
from Austria by the Magyar elite in return for political obedience at a time
when the Habsburgs were at a disadvantage, being defeated by Prussia at
Sadowa and losing Venetia to Italy. After its initial signature in , the
Austro-Hungarian compact would be renegotiated every ten years: four
drawn-out and quite painful ‘Compromise rounds’ prolonged its life until
World War I gave it a lethal blow. Because the Compromise was precisely
meant to prevent secession, it has often been portrayed as the continuation
of the Habsburg rule in a new guise, and as a result inherited much of
the Habsburgs’ unpopularity. Musil () again summarised the majority
view quite well when he pronounced the Compromise ‘more difficult to
comprehend than the Mystery of the Holy Trinity’. This article takes a
different view. In line with the early opinion of the British newspaper The
Economist, defining the Compromise as ‘the ultimate adjustment of all com-
mon interests between Austria and Hungary’ ( January ), it argues
that it should be studied as an economic bargain.
The importance of trade within the Habsburg Empire has already attracted
the attention of economic historians. Some years ago, John Komlos’ seminal
study (Komlos a) demonstrated that, contrary to traditional prejudice,
the Austro-Hungarian customs union provided huge benefits to Hungary:
Magyars were hardly victims. They gained from access to a wide market for
 Reclus (), p. .
 Ausgleich in German or kiegyeze´s in Hungarian.
 In , , , and . Negotiations usually started early and ended late.
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their agricultural products. Indeed, the measured effect of the Habsburg
union on bilateral commerce was a three-fold increase (Flandreau and
Maurel ). Moreover, substantial productivity gains were achieved by
Hungary between  and  in the agricultural sector (Schulze ).
However, nobody has examined the monetary aspects of the Compromise
so far, because nobody has looked at the Habsburg Empire as a monetary
union. This is because of the deceptive nature of the Compromise: The
Austro-Hungarian monetary union was not the result of a monetary marriage
but the by-product of a fiscal divorce. Austria and Hungary became in 
two sovereign budgetary entities. In the process, they retained a common
bank of issue and thus formed a de facto monetary union that would operate
until its post-World War I collapse (Nemec , Zeuceanu , and Garber
and Spencer ).
One consequence of this set-up was the development of a debate, not
over union, but over the mirror image problem of secession. Of course, the
reasons for not breaking free from a monetary union cannot be very different
from the reasons for joining it. This observation is in effect at the heart of the
modern political economy of the size of nations (see, for instance, Alesina
and Spolaore ). Consider a monetary union comprising two parts, a
‘large’ (Austria) and a ‘small’ (Hungary) country. The common central bank
delivers a range of services that are valuable to both parts, but not equally.
The exact mix of services produced depends on the division of power. If
power is proportional to size, the small country has very little control over
common decisions. It is bound by the discipline of the union without being
able to influence decision-making in a way that would address its own specific
interests. Co-operation (that is, participation in the union) is sub-optimal and
the small country prefers to quit. Sustained co-operation requires that the
large country accepts a decision-making process in which the small country
receives a greater voting share than size alone would predict.
Thus smaller ‘nations’ influence monetary unions disproportionately.
However, it is not clear why the large country should accept this dilution
of power. The normal outcome should therefore be secession: that is, a
multiplication of political entities customised to meet the demands of hetero-
geneous groups of agents. Conditions to prevent this result include Olson
and Zeckhauser’s free rider problem where the large agent cannot really avoid
free-riding by smaller members and prefers to commit them by giving them a
greater controlling share (Olson and Zeckhauser ); and Kindleberger’s
benevolent ‘hegemon’ case where the large agent internalises the costs of
anarchy (Kindleberger ). More relevant to the issue of monetary unions
however is the work of Casella () who shows that if co-operation
delivers a number of public goods that are useful to all parts, then the
large country may nonetheless accept a reduction of its relative ability to
set decisions, since the additional output may compensate for the initial
loss.
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The current article uses this class of insights to analyse the economic logic
of monetary bargaining in the Habsburg Empire, –. The vantage
point it takes is that of the small country – Hungary – showing how
secessionist threats succeeded in increasing its controlling share over the
common central bank. The article proceeds as follows. Section  gives a
narrative of Austro-Hungarian monetary negotiations between  and
. It shows that Hungary consistently increased its formal control before
reaching full parity with Austria. Section  focuses on the s when
secession was seriously considered before being somewhat mysteriously
discarded. Section  disposes of the view that fear of adverse consequences
of secession on reputation is what deterred Hungary from breaking apart.
Finally, Section  finds the explanation for the Hungarian turnabout in the
policies of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, which began supporting Hungary
over and beyond what statutes stipulated. The conclusion wraps up the
argument and makes suggestions for future research.
. Monetary union as deal-making: –
The  ‘Compromise’ delineated powers that were shared from those
that weren’t. Austria and Hungary would share a common market and
trade policy, monetary standard, legal system, army, diplomacy, foreign
representatives, and the Emperor of Austria would also be King of Hungary.
On the other hand, each part would have its own parliament, government,
and budget. Gerschenkron (, ) has emphasised the role of govern-
ment spending in Central European development policies in the nineteenth
century (see also Wysocki  and Brandt ): In effect, a key concern
of Hungarian elites when they requested fiscal sovereignty was to be able to
finance infrastructure spending, such as the building of railways.
Money had not been discussed in detail. The Compromise only provided
that the inconvertible notes of the Austrian National Bank, a private
institution under government charter, would continue to be legal tender with
the joint guarantee of the two parts. Moreover, through a separate agreement
between the two governments (not ratified by parliaments: see Zuckerkandl
), Hungarians assumed the obligation not to allow any bank of issue
to be created in their territory. This was acknowledging that the Austrian
National Bank was the sole bank of issue of the whole monarchy. Hence
while ‘monetary union’ between Austria and Hungary was not an explicit
part of the Compromise, it was an implication. The dual monarchy was a
de facto monetary union.
 The budgetary set up of the Habsburg monarchy can be called confederate. A common
budget served to pay for the army and the foreign policy, but this ‘federal’ level had no
authority over taxation. Its resources were, apart from the custom duties, transfers from
the two countries’ individual budgets. For details, see Flandreau ().
 Agreement of  September : Zuckerkandl ().
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However, in the nineteenth century, ‘banks of issue’ were seen as
important instruments for nation-state building. They provided the national
public good of a national market via homogenisation of the currency and
contribution to financial integration (Helleiner  and ). Controlling
credit was also seen as a policy instrument for redistribution across regions
and sectors. Finally, it was felt that ability to rediscount ‘national’ bills would
encourage the ‘national’ economy and the creation of ‘national banks’ was
supported by economic elites.
The Austrian National Bank was thus not long in seeking formal recog-
nition from the Hungarian Diet. Hungary had conditions: an autonomous
Direktion in Budapest (as opposed to the existing Subsidiary), with more
resources. The bank refused (Ko¨ve´r and Poga´ny ). Hungary’s requests
escalated as the  crash of the Vienna and Berlin stock exchanges led to
widespread calls for bank support to depressed areas (Bailey ). The
expiration of the privileges of the O¨NB at the end of  was also in
sight. It conveniently happened to coincide with the renegotiation of the
Compromise. Monetary bargaining involved the Austrian government, the
Hungarian government and the shareholders of the Austrian National Bank.
Experimenting with a technique that would be used repeatedly, the Magyars
threatened to set up a National Bank of Hungary. On the other hand,
shareholders were worried about granting control to a ‘foreign’ authority
(shareholders were mostly citizens of Austria). The Austrian government
was concerned among other things with preserving the political unity of
the monarchy. In the end, on  July , the Bank became the Austro-
Hungarian Bank (O¨sterreichisch-ungarische Bank in German – Osztra´k-
magyar bank in Hungarian).
By this act, the new bank (which inherited the balance sheet of its
predecessor) became a ‘federal’ institution. It had two main ‘Managements’
(Hauptanstalten) in Vienna and Budapest respectively, run by a ‘Managing
Board’ (Direktion) and a central office in Vienna, headed by the General
Council (Generalrath), the executive body of the bank in charge of setting the
discount rate. The sophisticated design of the Bank’s organisational chart
is a suggestion of the intricacy of the discussions involved (see Noe¨l ,
Conant , and Zuckerkandl  for details). The Governor was to be
appointed by the Emperor and King upon joint nomination of the Austrian
and Hungarian finance ministers. He was to be seconded by two Vice-
Governors, one Hungarian and one Austrian, appointed by their respective
governments from a list submitted by the shareholders. There were also
twelve Councillors: at least two had to be Austrian and two Hungarian, and
the rest were appointed at the will of the assembly of shareholders. The
 Hungary was a case in point. During the  uprising, the emergency Magyar
government had given the exclusive right of issue to a Hungarian Commercial Bank in which
Kossuth, hero of the Revolution, played a major role (see Le´vy a, p.  and b).
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Governor, the Vice-Governors and the Councillors formed the General
Council. The Managing Boards were presided over by the Vice-Governors of
the respective nationalities. The two governments were entitled to a share of
the profits. Finally, the new charter had a short duration of ten years, against
 years for earlier ones. This was obviously the Compromise’s signature.
Austro-Hungarian arrangements were renewed without substantial change
or resistance in . However, during the s, the decision to stabilise
the paper florin onto a gold parity (called the crown and worth . florins at
the current exchange rate) reopened difficult issues. The reform envisioned
the transfer of all monetary prerogatives from the fiscal authorities (national
governments) to the Bank (Flandreau ). Specifically, governments had
to repurchase early issues of state notes and discontinue silver coinage for
their own account. Since new issues of state notes had been ruled out in 
and silver coinage was marginal, there was no loss of monetary control. But
the repurchase of government paper was costly. The Austrian government
used this as an excuse to claim some form of control, and it was supported
by Hungary who was not so sure it should contribute to repurchase pre-
Compromise paper issues. According to external observers ‘the general
opinion is that there ought to be substantial restrictions on the autonomy
of the Bank’. The Bank insisted that the credibility of the currency would
gain from this so that no further compensation was needed. It also wanted
a longer duration of its charter to be protected from the political hazards of
periodic compromise rounds.
Hungary floated its now routine secessionist threat. Premier Wekerle
suggested creating two separate banks of issue. The fall of the Hungarian
cabinet removed part of the urgency, facilitating monetary stabilisation.
Despite no agreement being reached, the Bank nonetheless began pegging
the florin exchange rate within gold points, a scheme that would last until
World War I (Flandreau and Komlos ). But Hungarians insisted that
they wanted full parity within the common bank, and made it an absolute
 Austria was entitled to  per cent and Hungary to  per cent of the portion of dividends
that was not distributed to shareholders.
 Such short charters were rare by European standards : see Flandreau et al. ().
 Law of  May .
 Cre´dit lyonnais Archives, ‘Re´forme de la Valuta’, Cre´dit lyonnais Archives, DEEF .
 This was the substance of the so-called Mecenseffy memorandum of : Flandreau
().
 ‘Aujourd’hui, la Banque appele´e a` proposer ses conditions les a faites tellement exorbitantes qu’on
a pense´ a` cre´er a` sa place deux Banques nouvelles: une Autrichienne et une Hongroise’. Cre´dit
lyonnais Archives, DEEF , ‘Re´forme de la Valuta’. See also Conant (), p. :
‘The tendency towards local institutions in Hungary has led to considerable discussion of
the project of separate banks of issue [ . . . ] and this was one of the reasons why the project
for the renewal of the charter proposed by the Imperial bank in the Spring  was not
accepted by the two governments’.
 According to Lyonnais’ economists, ‘depuis la chute de M. Vekerle´ (sic), cette ide´e paraıˆt
abandonne´e’ (Cre´dit lyonnais Archives, DEEF ).
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condition for their continued co-operation. After two more years of muddling
through they eventually got their way. The new Charter, granted by the
law of  September , was valid until  (that is, slightly beyond
the date when the next Compromise was to be renegotiated, in ).
It formally acknowledged that each nation retained the right to set up
its own bank. Monetary sovereignty was thus a political prerogative, and
the common central bank, an alienation of that right. Moreover, statutes
resulted in establishing full parity. The influence of shareholders over
appointments was reduced to drawing up a list of eligible candidates,
which Hungary and Austria formally designated. The autonomy of each
regional direction was enhanced (Michel , p. ). It was further decided
that the shareholders assembly would meet in either Vienna or Budapest
depending on the majority’s country of residence. Profits accruing to
the two governments became a function of where bank income originated.
Finally, the influence of the two national commissaries was increased beyond
their former purely consultative vote. After , they had a veto right,
motivated by exceptional circumstances (‘raison d’e´tat’).
There was thus a definite trend in Hungary’s formal influence within
the common Bank. This trend was also reflected in substantive policies of
the Bank, such as the coverage of the Magyar territory by subsidiaries. As
Figure  shows, the Austro-Hungarian National Bank transformed itself
from being a predominantly Austrian institution in  into being a truly
binational institution. There were only five Hungarian branches out of  in
 ( per cent), but  out of  in  ( per cent), and  out of  in
 ( per cent). One sure criterion by which to assess the achievements
of Hungary is to compare its ‘share of the cake’ with economic size: with
about  per cent of the dual monarchy’s population, Hungary controlled
 per cent of the decision-making process. And with about  per cent of
the Habsburg GDP, it hosted  per cent of the Bank’s branches. Therefore,
Hungary had a more than proportional influence. Moreover, we saw that
this had been secured by threatening to set up its own bank. In light of the
theoretical elements discussed in the introduction, the implication must be
 The account given by Pressburger () is interesting. The Austrian government would
have presented the Bank with a choice of increased Austrian control or Hungarian parity.
It apparently wanted to corner the Bank in order to secure increased control. The Bank
opted for the latter despite a long tradition of Austrian support against Hungary. The
Bank may have wanted to encourage rivalry between governments. It must have
discounted the risk of collusion.
 In practice, the vast majority of shareholders were Austrians and until  the Assembly
always gathered in Vienna.
 Cre´dit lyonnais Archives, DEEF , Banque Austro-Hongroise, , p. .
 According to external observers, this had been introduced under Hungarian pressure to
restrain Austria’s influence: Cre´dit lyonnais Archives, DEEF , Banque
Austro-Hongroise, , p. . Note that since the veto did not encompass the setting of
the discount rate, monetary policy was essentially free from government interference. But
Hertz () is less confident.
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Figure . Total number of agencies (branches plus management) in Austria
and Hungary.
Source: Annual reports of the Austrian National Bank and of the Austro-Hungarian
Bank, National Library Vienna.
that Hungarians would have been able to secure better terms for themselves
had they actually quit the union than the ones they would have faced if those
favourable adjustments had not taken place. And of course, it must also be
the case that both Austria and the Austro-Hungarian Bank found the deal
palatable – the alternative being that they had no choice.
. The independent Hungarian Bank: rise and fall
On January , , a coalition led by the Independence Party, or ‘Party
of ’, defeated the incumbent Liberal Party. The Independence Party
was headed by Ferencz Kossuth, son of the  hero. Despite the Emperor
and King’s animadversions, Kossuth was received in Vienna in late February.
His party’s claims were a separate army, diplomacy, trade policy, and custom
duties inside the union. They could not be readily implemented, because they
did not represent the coalition’s consensus. However, former supporters of
the Liberal Party, led by Wekerle, set up their own ‘Dissidents’ group, and
leant towards Kossuth. On  April , a Wekerle cabinet was created, in
which Kossuth participated. At this point, monetary secession, the only kind
 For a chronicle of the episode, see The Economist,  February, p. ,  February,
p. –, .
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of separation that was feasible without Vienna’s formal agreement, became
the focus of nationalists.
In the Spring of , separatists began a campaign against the
Austro-Hungarian Bank, criticising ‘overly restrictive’ monetary policies,
‘unsuitable’ to Transleithania. Attacks on the monetary union were taken
seriously: special arrangements to decide on a unit of account in the event of
secession were considered. Austrian banks such as the Boden Creditanstalt
took steps to make sure credits would always be paid back in Austrian
money. The Compromise of  did contain provisions for the liquidation
of crown debts. The fate of the bank remained pending. On  December
, a worried General Assembly of shareholders requested from the
Imperial and Royal governments a renewal of the charter before its scheduled
expiration date of December .
By that time, however, it had become clear that secession had stirred
much debate within Hungary. In March , the Wekerle government
set up a special parliamentary committee, the ‘Hollo Commission’, to
examine the technicalities of separation from Austria. A questionnaire was
sent out to leading economists. Hearings turned out to be a forum of
dissenting opinions (Michel ). Despite the exiguity of Hungary’s ruling
classes, two opposed views emerged. On the one hand was Budapest,
where bankers feared that monetary secession would make it difficult to
tap the Vienna money market. The Hungarian land-owning gentry, who
lived in Budapest and were Count Tisza’s Liberal Party’s base, also shared
this position. It feared that dissolution of the monetary union would herald
the collapse of the custom union. Austria might then increase tariffs on
corn and force Hungarian producers to compete against Russia for their
 External observers saw monetary secession as a consequence of the Kossuth program.
Conant, for instance, describes it as ‘one of the projects which grew logically out of the
movement which gained momentum at the beginning of the twentieth century for the
restoration of Hungarian independence’ (Conant , p. ).
 Similar attacks on ‘too high’ interest rates had been repeatedly heard in the past, but this
time they were crystallising. Michel (, p. –).
 Michel (, p. ).
 The so-called ‘Benedikt clause’ (after Moritz Benedikt, famous owner of the Austrian
newspaper Neue Freie Presse) was negotiated between the two governments, but not
presented to the Parliaments. It recognised the need, should monetary separation occur,
to fix the value of the Austro-Hungarian exchange rate in order to protect outstanding
contracts against the exchange risk which might follow secession.
 Cre´dit lyonnais Archives, DEEF , Banque Austro-Hongroise, p. . The demand was
officially transmitted to each government on  December .
 The choice of  members in the commission symbolically evoked the  commission
of experts on the adoption of the gold standard in the dual monarchy; see Conant ().
 L’Economiste Europe´en,  April , XXXIII, p. .
 According to Tatu Vanhanen’s Polyarchy database, these were below  per cent of the
population before World War I. On Hungarian parliamentarism, see Hajdu ().
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market. An Austrian observer argued: ‘One thing is certain: just as it is
absolutely necessary to have a common currency and a common bank for
a common trade area, it is impossible to keep together a common trade
area without a common bank and a common currency. The leaders of the
Independence Party seem to believe that it is politically easier to obtain
a monetary separation than a division of the trade area, and consequently
tenaciously pursue their goal of a separate bank, in the hope that the customs
union will collapse by itself as a result’ (Federn , p. –).
On the other hand the pro-secession group comprised ‘provincial’
interests. These included chiefly the Chambers of Commerce representing
industrialists and regional bankers. The industrialists discarded the risk of
exchange depreciation, which at worst would boost their competitiveness
(Michel , p. ). They were also prepared for custom duties within the
monarchy, since this meant protection against Austria’s industry. They also
wanted cheap credit and believed that a national bank would be successful at
meeting their specific needs. Regional bankers concurred, complaining that
the Austro-Hungarian Bank was not paying enough attention. They claimed
they were victims of discrimination and credit rationing. The contrast
between bankers’ views in Budapest and the provinces is really intriguing.
How could Budapest and the Provinces differ so much?
As divisions became apparent in , two evolutions took place. First,
regional interests, and especially bankers, began adopting more union-
friendly tones. The chasm between financiers in Budapest and the regions
was being bridged over. In February , a congress of provincial bankers
acknowledged that access to the common bank’s discounting facilities was
quite useful. The conference concluded with a declaration reflecting the
turnabout: ‘This century is not devoted to disruption but to intense and
pervasive exchanges, to mutual understanding, to reasonable compromises.
Agreeing on the basis that is necessary to the satisfaction of all parts involved
is in no way a lack of patriotism.’
Second, evidence that a fraction of the public wanted to retain some
benefits of a common central bank led Wekerle to produce an alternative
secession scheme. It combined full separation between the two parts of
the Austro-Hungarian Bank along with a cartel agreement between the two
resulting entities. The ‘Central Bank Cartel’ would impose a uniform interest
rate throughout both countries, and a fixed exchange rate between each part.
That would still be a monetary union, but the centralisation of decision-
making would be restricted to a minimum. From what we can understand,
it seems that the scheme envisioned reciprocal par acceptance of the notes
issued by each bank. The free-rider problem was obvious, and resulted in
depriving Austria of control over the money supply. Agents would have
obtained credit where it was cheapest (in Hungary), and monetary policy
 Quoted in Neue Freie Presse,  February .
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would have been set in Budapest. The Austrian reaction was ‘quick and
violent’. It could not prevent Hungary from setting up its own bank, but it
could refuse cooperation with that scheme. On  April , the Emperor
Franz-Josef vetoed the Cartel on the ground that it endangered the solidity
and credit of the Austro-Hungarian bank of issue.
By the Autumn of , the Independence Party was disintegrating:
extremists led by Justh insisted on the strict application of the initial project
of a fully sovereign Hungarian National Bank. But a more moderate faction,
led by Kossuth and Count Apponyi, resisted. The Wekerle Cabinet fell
in January . Hungary began to negotiate a renewal of the Austro-
Hungarian Bank’s charter for another ten years. In the Spring of  a new
election sealed the fate of the Independence Party. An arrangement was
arrived at with the Bank before the former statutes expired. The charter of
October  extended the life of the common bank for another round in
essentially the same shape as in . The independent central bank project
had collapsed, apparently of Hungary’s own accord. In , the Hungarian
finance minister Teleszky would declare: ‘The common bank is a better
deal for us than an independent bank of issue would have been’. What had
changed between  and  that made secession so much less attractive?
 Federn (, p. ).
 This mechanism is known as the inflationary bias of common currencies: if, in a monetary
union, money issues are decentralised, an inflationary bias will emerge with each central
bank seeking to exploit the union by exporting the costs of inflation. Flandreau ()
argues that if central banks retain the right to discriminate against foreign notes, they can
enforce discipline. This was understood by contemporaries. According to Federn (,
p. ): ‘Where did the risk lie? In the maintenance of the value of notes. The Hungarian
notes, if there was no legal obligation to take them at par in Austria, would have been very
much as the notes of other foreign banks – a fluctuating value in the Austrian bourse. [ . . . ]
The Hungarian bank would have had to make sure that it would always hold a metallic
treasure so that nobody would doubt the capacity of Hungary to meet its foreign
obligations, in gold if necessary. Hungary would have had for this purpose to raise its
discount rate in order to prevent the excesses of credit that would cause too big an efflux
of notes, and a disequilibrium between the reserve and the outstanding circulation. On
the other hand, if Hungarian notes were to be taken at par in Austria, Hungary would
have neglected to behave, because it could always have poured into Austria its surplus of
notes. Then the problem would have been Austria’s [ . . . ] The advantages of the
independent bank of issue, if they exist, would have been for Hungarians, with Austrians
eliminating the risks.’
 See Economiste Europe´en,  May , XXXV, p. . The newspaper also mentions that
the Budapest stock exchange welcomed the collapse of the central bank cartel project.
The cabinet was not replaced until January .
 According to Le´vy ‘the elections of the Spring of  have given a large majority which is
hostile to extreme solutions; the renewal of the privilege of the Common Bank seems
more and more likely’, p. –.
 Neue Freie Presse,  September , ‘Eine Grosse Anlehenemission in Ungarn’, p. –.
Quoted in Michel (, p. ).
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. Reputation and secession
Supporters of secession vituperated that the change of mind had resulted
from their adversaries’ skilful propaganda. They accused them of having
threatened the ‘less knowledgeable categories of national production’ with
apocalyptic and of course unfounded predictions such as a ‘constant, ruinous
increase of the discount rate’. Given the elitist nature of the debate, it is
not clear that such accusations were warranted. One does find evidence of
sophisticated contemporary discussions of the economics of secession, as
illustrated for instance by two survey articles published in . The first, by
Federn, editor of the O¨sterreichische Volkswirt, supported the continuation of
monetary union. The second, by one Aberdam, popularised the views of Be´la
Fo¨lde´s (a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Budapest and
expert for the Hungarian monetary commission of ), who supported
secession. Taken together, the two articles provide a comprehensive review
of the arguments.
Protagonists concurred that assessing properly the costs of secession
hinged critically on measuring the cost of capital with and without monetary
union. Thanks to the pioneering work of economist Frigyes Fellner on
Hungary’s balance of payment (Fellner , , ), contemporaries
were aware of Hungary’s dependence on foreign capital. Hungarian
government bonds were largely held in Austria, even if this fraction was
declining in the early s, owing to purchases by Hungarians investors
(Figure ). Moreover, scattered evidence pointed to a substantial reliance of
Hungary on short-term capital from Vienna. Overdrafts and deposits from
Viennese banks helped finance credit expansion in Hungary.
Opponents of secession emphasised that the lack of a common currency
might complicate Hungary’s management of its external books. For instance,
Viennese banks would not be as willing to supply money to their Hungarian
counterparts as they had been previously. Difficulties could also arise if
Austrians were to dump Hungarian securities on the market. Federn argued
that ‘Austria removes the problem of stabilization of the currency from
Hungary, and that is probably the greatest service which Austria gives to
the Hungarians, through the banking and monetary community’. Finally
there would be exchange rate fluctuations, which, albeit small (they would
 Aberdam (, p. ).
 See his opinions on monetary stabilisation in Gutachten u¨ber die O¨sterreichisch-ungarische
Wa¨hrungs-Reform, p. –.
 See especially Fellner (, p. –). Michel (, p. ) emphasises Hungary’s
dependence on ‘Austria and the rest of the world, not only for government bonds but for
railways and other sectors as well, such as banks (only  per cent of Hungarian banks’
capital was held in Hungary in ). See Pammer () for new material.
 See Flandreau and Gallice () for a discussion of the mechanisms involved.
 Michel () provides estimates of the extent of this support.
 Federn (, p. ).
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Figure . Breakdown of Hungarian state securities.
Source: Fellner, . The figures were derived from information on where the
coupon on Hungary’s ‘special debt’ was paid. This does not include the part of the
pre- ‘common debt’ for which an annuity was paid to Austria.
occur within ‘gold points’ since it was generally agreed that a sovereign
Hungary would be on gold) would require the National Bank of Hungary to
raise interest rates when needed. But would the new Bank of Hungary enjoy
the experience and credibility of the Austro-Hungarian Bank? Secession
might have perverse effects given its intended objective of a greater supply
of credit.
Secessionists conceded that over the short run there might be some costs,
due to the inevitable ‘jolts of transition, lack of experience and age-old
traditions on behalf of the new Bank, and exchange rate fluctuations’.
But the process would generate self-stabilising forces in a ‘neo-classical’
fashion: with Austrian sales of Hungarian securities, yields would rise, but
this would encourage foreigners to increase their holdings of Hungarian
bonds, restoring equilibrium. To the notion that an adverse balance of
payments meant losing gold and forced discount rate increases, secessionists
objected using an early variant of the monetary approach to the balance
 The new Bank, warned Federn, ‘would have to take care that its notes get a stable price in
foreign exchanges, if it wanted to prevent damaging its reputation’, Federn (,
p. ).
 Aberdam (, p. ).
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of payments (Frenkel and Johnson ). International gold flows were
determined by national monetary requirements, not by the current account.
The international monetary equilibrium produced a ‘smooth distribution
of gold between the various countries, according to each nation’s needs’.
If gold leaked out in excess of needs, interest rates might rise but only
transitorily, and this would check the export of gold thus ruling out the
supposed need for continued interest rate hikes (this is similar to McCloskey
and Zecher ). After all, other debtor countries were able to retain their
gold reserves.
Thus, secessionists disregarded the transition to the post-separation
equilibrium as a problem of secondary importance. Perfect international
arbitrage (the ‘resources of modern finance’ and the ‘speed of communica-
tions’ in the language of the time) would ensure that monetary equilibrium be
obtained at low cost. Some institutional details could determine the cyclical
behaviour of interest rates. But a carefully designed exit strategy would
prevent interest rates from rising. If a given security is indeed a low risk,
someone will inevitably end up holding it at the right price: the question
thus boiled down to a matter of ‘credit standing’. Secession only required
‘foreign confidence, on which in the last analysis all economic relations rest.
As long as Hungary knows how to retain that trust, its transactions will
not encounter, on the international money market, any serious difficulty.’
 « Si la solidarite´ e´troite du mouvement de l’or et de la balance des dettes et des cre´ances existait, le
pays a` balance de´favorable se verrait – en bonne logique – vite de´pouille´ de son me´tal pre´cieux
[ . . . ] Conclusion e´videmment absurde », Aberdam (, p. ).
 Aberdam (, p. ).
 This included the precise institutional design of the central bank. Among options,
Aberdam (, p. ) identifies the British model of assertive interest rate increases to
check gold outflows, the French one of gold devices, and the German system of moral
suasion. Separatists found that the British case required a degree of financial development
Hungary had not reached, and opted for one of the Continental models.
 Aberdam (, p. ). Secessionists even called mathematical economics to the rescue,
emphasising that the ultimate determinant of interest rates was marginal productivity of
capital, which was bound to equalise across the world. Aberdam explicitly quotes the work
of the Italian economist (and later politician) Francesco Saverio Nitti, who had
demonstrated in  that ‘in the ideal case of a pure credit economy, the maximum
interest rate is given by the average profit rate’. It seems that Aberdam was referring to La
misura delle variazioni di valore della moneta, quoted by Fisher ().
 Such was the conventional view among contemporaries. As James de Rothschild had
reminded the Austrian minister of finance a few months after the first Compromise was
signed ‘the price of public securities is, with good reasons, considered as the exact
measure of the degree of trust which national credit deserves. It is on that basis that the
credit of all national companies is in turn assessed, and, from that point of view it has a
tremendous influence on the development of prosperity’. Quoted in Gille ().
 Aberdam (, p. ).
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On this account, secessionists emphasised that the Magyar government had
‘never abused its creditors, never reneged on its commitments’.
Who was right? This paragraph focuses on one aspect of the debate,
namely the effect of secession on bond prices. In , Hungary’s public
debts comprised two parts: on the one hand were Hungary’s ‘domestic’
paper bonds, denominated in crowns. On the other hand were the ‘gold’
bonds, denominated in Western European gold convertible currencies. The
concern opponents to secession had was that paper bonds, denominated
in the union’s currency, were ‘at home’ both in Vienna and Budapest, and
in effect largely held in Vienna. Haupt () indicated that around ,
 per cent of Hungary’s paper debts were held in Hungary,  per cent in
Vienna and only  per cent abroad. But this situation would only continue
for as long as Hungary remained within the monetary union. In the event
of monetary secession, and even if debts were denominated in Austrian
currency as they normally would have been (redenomination in Hungarian
currency being equivalent to a default since it had not been considered in
initial contracts), Austrians might have become much less eager to hold such
bonds. As for investors outside the Habsburg Empire – in Berlin, Paris, or
London – they might not have been willing to make up the difference and
buy what Austria might be selling. This, not so much because of distrust,
but rather because of the transaction costs they faced when cashing their
coupons or performing arbitrage operations. The market for crowns in, say,
Berlin, was less liquid than the market for, say, sterling, explaining why such
a modest fraction of Hungary’s crown paper debts ( per cent in ) was
held outside the dual monarchy. Therefore, the argument would go, the bulk
of Hungary’s crown debts would have inevitably fallen back into Hungarian
hands, causing a deterioration in borrowing conditions.
But this problem could be taken care of via financial innovation. One only
had to combine secession with a conversion of the crown debts into gold
debts. Indeed this was the standard purpose of including foreign exchange
clauses in debt contracts – to secure a liquid market abroad (Flandreau
and Sussman ). Haupt () provides evidence on the effects of gold
clauses circa : the breakdown of Hungarian gold debts was  per cent
abroad,  per cent in Austria, and  per cent in Hungary. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, financially literate Hungarian separatist authorities opened talks
with international banks in  in order to organise a conversion of
Hungarian government debts traded in Vienna into some gold-denominated
 See Ko¨ve´r () on how Hungary acquired a reputation in the early s by agreeing to
pay the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders a balance that was due by Austria.
 Haupt’s source was Dr Ignaz Gruber, Tabellen zur Wa¨hrungsfrage (Vienna: Ministry of
Finance, ). Corresponding numbers for Austria are:  per cent of government paper
debts held in Austria,  per cent in Hungary and  per cent abroad.
 Corresponding totals for Austrian gold debts were: held abroad  per cent; held in
Austria  per cent; held in Hungary  per cent.
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international instrument (Michel ). As they discovered, the size of
the required conversion would be manageable. Standing at  per cent
of Hungary’s so-called ‘special debts’ in , paper debts declined to
 per cent in  and  per cent in .
Thus the whole issue boils down to measuring the impact of secession on
the yield on gold-denominated government securities. While this cannot be
measured directly, it is possible to address a tightly related question. We can
determine whether Hungary benefited from better borrowing conditions as
a result of her being part of the Habsburg Empire. In Flandreau and Zumer
(), we used contemporary data to price gold bonds yields for an almost
comprehensive list of European nations (plus Argentina and Brazil) in the
late nineteenth century (–). The study found that debt burdens,
measured as the ratio of debt service to government revenues, accounted for
most of the cross-sectional and time series variations of long term interest
rates. Because the sample precisely contains sovereign countries of varied
size, location, and reputation, it provides an estimate of the average elasticity
of borrowing terms to the debt burden for a sovereign nation, and can thus
serve to simulate what would have been Hungary’s borrowing costs, had it
been sovereign.
If being part of the Habsburg Monarchy improved Hungary’s borrowing
prospects, then we should find that Hungary faced lower rates than those
implied by its ‘fundamentals’, using the general formula that applies to
sovereigns. Figure  provides a visual test of the value of being part of
the Habsburg Empire. It depicts the actual spread between Hungarian and
Austrian yields, the simulated one (obtained using the general formula for
sovereign countries), and confidence margins. If Hungary benefited from
union, we should expect the simulated spread to be significantly above
the observed one. But the actual and simulated spreads are very close to
one another, and discrepancies are neither large (at most  basis points)
nor significant. One can reject the hypothesis that membership of the
Habsburg monarchy entailed credibility gains. Hungary was essentially
priced as a sovereign nation. One interpretation, of course, is that Habsburg
membership was never taken very seriously by the market, given all the
secessionist threats, so that investors had already priced Hungary as a
 Author’s computations, from Cre´dit lyonnais Archives. Figures refer to the fraction of
post- debts. I have included the crown debts of the s on the understanding that
these included fixed exchange rate clauses.
 For details, see Flandreau and Zumer (, p. – and –).
 Interestingly, the  election might have played a role in marginally deteriorating
borrowing conditions, but the effect remains very modest.
 Contrast with the discussion in Eddie () who argues that Franz-Joseph would never
have accepted that Hungary would default. That Hungarian rates were on average above
Austrian rates is evidence that investors disagreed. And this is the only thing that matters
when measuring the costs of secession.
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Figure . Hungarian premium: observed and simulated.
Source: Author’s computations (see text and Appendix).
sovereign country; in which case we may understand why secession could
not have affected borrowing costs.
Strictly speaking, this finding says nothing about what would have actually
happened in the event of secession. Hungarians authorities might of course
have become crazy, they might have printed money, issued debt, defaulted,
and so on. Or they might have been able to cut military spending, improve
their fiscal capacity by raising custom duties, and similar measures. All
these moves would have influenced yields in one way or another, so that
a ‘complete’ counterfactual is just not feasible. The point, however, is that
they might have followed just the same policies as they actually did, and
wouldn’t have behaved worse than any other sovereign nation of the time.
But that’s all we need to prove: that in this case the market would not have
penalised Hungary. In sum, we should not look in the bond market for
participation incentives, for they were just not there.
. ‘A better deal for us’: the Austro-Hungarian Bank
and the Compromise
So why didn’t Hungary secede? This article’s interpretation of why monetary
union turned out to be a better deal for Hungary rests on two complementary
arguments, having to do with national and international monetary
integration respectively. Consider international monetary integration first.
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The previous section has shown that the credibility costs of secession were
probably inessential since financial innovation could secure a replacement for
Vienna as supplier of capital. Not all costs could be escaped, however. In a
sovereign Hungary, private credit, in the form of bill discounting, would
be conducted at higher costs than if the Magyars remained part of the
Empire. This is because, as long as they were part of the Empire, Hungarian
borrowers could draw crown-denominated bills of exchange on Viennese
correspondents. These bills could then be sold anywhere in the world where
Viennese financiers had connections. Flandreau and Jobst () show
that the Austro-Hungarian currency was traded in a very large number of
centres. It was bought and sold in virtually every European market and
in a few non-European markets such as Mexico. Its international standing
was comparable to that of the Dutch florin or Belgian franc, two important
European currencies.
Moreover, Flandreau and Jobst () report evidence of a tight
correlation between international circulation (measured by the number of
markets where a given currency was traded) and short-term commercial
rates. At a time when fixed exchange rates ruled, persistent interest
differentials must be interpreted as liquidity premiums. Figure  illustrates
this relation for . As can be seen, currencies traded in the smallest
number of foreign markets had short-term interest rates at least  basis
points above London rates (and possibly much more since it is quite
likely that the true relation was non-linear). The currency of the Habsburg
monarchy, which enjoyed regional circulation, had rates on average only
about  basis points above London. Against this background, a reasonable
guess on the rates that would have prevailed in an independent Hungary can
be inferred. Roughly speaking, Hungary would not be very unlike Romania,
or roughly  basis points above London. A more rigorous measure is to
use empirical data to predict the number of markets where the Hungarian
currency would have been traded. The answer one gets is that it would have
been traded in one foreign market at most – Vienna. Using the regression
line in Figure , we may conclude that Hungarian short term spreads against
British rates would have stood at about  basis points above what they were
when Hungary was part of the dual monarchy. This is one measure of the
cost of secession, and it is substantial.
An independent Hungary would thus have had a higher discount rate than
if it had remained part of the Habsburg union. This helps in understanding
the commitment of Budapest bankers to monetary union, discussed earlier,
 The procedure is to use the estimated parameters of the determinants of foreign quotation
considered in Flandreau and Jobst (), and then simulate the number of expected
quotations on the basis of data for Hungary. For simplicity, it is assumed that Hungarian
trade patterns are constant post-secession. Given the pre-secession concentration of
Hungarian trade this provides an upper bound to the likely number of quotations.
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Figure . International circulation and interest rates.
Source: See text. Indices of international liquidity are from Flandreau and Jobst
[]. Interest rates are from Flandreau and Jobst [].
and their concerns that secession would mean a higher price for working
capital. But how to understand then that Hungarians could be so bold and so
successful when threatening secession? And how could regional bankers fail
to understand this? To explain this paradox, we must take into account the
existence of very poor regional monetary integration of Hungarian provinces
with the rest of the monarchy, including Budapest. While precise data on
this are lacking, anecdotal evidence suggests that Hungary’s provinces had
substantially higher interest rates than the rest of the monarchy. Moreover,
a parallel may be drawn with the findings of David Good for Austria (Good
a, b). Good reports evidence of higher interest rates in Austria’s
provinces than in Vienna during the period –, and shows that
these differentials declined in proportion to the decrease in transaction costs
 According to Michel (), p. , the Austrian Vice-Governor argued during the
Generalrath meeting of  June  that the current bank rate was ‘certainly too low’
given Hungary’s systematic tendency to have higher rates.
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Figure a. Setting circa : integration between Budapest and Vienna,
no integration between Budapest and Hungarian provinces.
and the greater circulation of capital across regions. Most critically, Good
specifically acknowledged the importance of the central bank in fostering
market integration in Austria. In any case, all evidence we have on the relative
development of the two parts of the monarchy, both economic and financial,
points to Hungarian retardation and a worse situation in its provinces.
Therefore, there was gap between the credit conditions in Hungarian regions
and those in Budapest. For the Provinces, the benefits of being tied to an
international currency could be offset by local inefficiencies. A better course
of action was thus to set up an independent bank in Budapest. This would
create higher benchmark rates in Budapest, but could also help to push down
local rates.
A simple model of credit markets can help clarify the intuition (Figures a
to c). We consider the situation around . Bankers in Budapest can
rediscount bills at the Austro-Hungarian Bank’s rate. Interest rates in
Budapest are thus equal to interest rates in Vienna. Hungarian Provinces
are isolated by large transaction costs and face high rates. Figure b shows
what would have happened had secessionists got their way. Conditions in
Budapest would have deteriorated, but conditions in the Provinces would
have improved given that the Hungarian National Bank would have improved
Hungarian money market integration. Obviously, the net gain from secession
depends on balancing the costs and benefits: but we do not need to get into
that to explain the conflict between alternative groups of bankers identified
earlier. Of course, a superior arrangement (from the point of view of all
 Some partial results on Hungary, supporting the intuition here, but for an earlier time
period are provided by Good ().
 For traditional references, see, for example, Hertz (), Katus (), Berend and
Ranki (), Rudolph () and Eddie (). Modern references include Komlos
(b), Good (), and Good and Ma ().
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Figure c. Effects of market integration and monetary union.
Hungarian interests) is one where the Austro-Hungarian Bank takes care of
fixing Hungary’s regional integration problem. Then, both Budapest and the
Hungarian provinces gain. A prediction of this analysis, shown in Figure c,
is that there should be a massive transfer of credit to Hungarian Provinces.
Figure  shows what happened to the Austro-Hungarian Bank’s portfolio
of commercial bills after the victory of the Independence Party in . Four
items are identified: ‘Vienna’, ‘Budapest’, ‘Austrian branches’ and ‘Hun-
garian branches’. Between , when the campaign against the bank began,
and , when Teleszky pronounced the common bank ‘a better deal’, the
share of the Hungarian branches’ discounts increased from being the lowest
to being the highest. This is exactly the prediction in Figure c. A better deal
indeed: Hungary’s second thoughts may be easier to understand now.
Further evidence can be obtained by looking at Figure , which shows
the average maturity of bills held. In Hungarian branches, maturity was
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close to two months throughout the entire period under study. It was by
contrast much lower in Budapest and in Austrian provinces, and even lower
in Vienna ( days). This shows that, while the Bank acted in Vienna more
like a ‘modern’ central bank, rediscounting bills from bankers, it behaved in
Hungarian provinces as a primary discount house, probably supplying funds
to merchants, industrialists and certainly local financiers. Combining this
with the evidence of an increase in overall lending, we must conclude that
the Austro-Hungarian Bank became after  a powerful engine of regional
market integration in Hungary.
These elements point to a simple interpretation of the failure of the
Hungarian National Bank project. The reason why secessionists lost the
support of the provincial elites is because the Bank bought in this group.
The generous share of the total credit supply of the Bank that the Hungarian
provinces received aligned their incentives with their Budapest counterparts.
By standing ready to give credit in Hungarian Provinces at conditions close
to those in Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Bank provided a net benefit that
would be lost in the event of secession. This is what stabilised the bargaining
relation within the monarchy. Historian Bernard Michel once suggested:
‘Financial links between Vienna and Budapest were one of the strongest
foundations of the continuation of the Compromise’ (Michel , p. ).
This article has provided some elements on why and how this was the case.
Conclusions
This article has argued that the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 
should be studied as a bargain in which monetary interests loomed large. But
if the compromise was a ‘deal’ then the natural instruments of investigation
should be the tools of public economics and political economy. We found
that the survival of the monetary union between Austria and Hungary really
resulted from an adjustment of incentives. Hungary had been able to secure
formal control over the common central bank. Moreover after  it was
also able to secure an increasing share of Austro-Hungarian Bank lending.
This evolution makes perfect sense in the light of the theoretical elements
put forward in the Introduction. Because the Magyars had pretty definite
ideas about what their development strategy should look like, and because
they were prepared to discontinue their membership of monetary union if
they did not have their way, their negotiating counterparts had to give in, or
face the prospect of secession.
What remains to be fully understood, therefore, are the motives for
Austria and the Austro-Hungarian Bank shareholders’ behaviour. Future
research should explore this matter systematically, but a few leads seem
obvious. For Austria, candidate explanations include security, dynastic and
imperial considerations. Economic factors might have played a role as well:
for instance, one such is the maintenance of the crown as an international
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currency. It is likely, and in effect, consistent with the evidence in Flandreau
and Jobst (), that the size of the dual monarchy was a critical factor
in explaining the international success of its currency: Austria might have
suffered from becoming smaller as a result of Hungary’s secession. An
additional important item was the impact of the monetary union on
bilateral trade. There again, Austria would have lost from secession. Another
promising research avenue is to explore the co-operation incentives of the
Austro-Hungarian Bank. However it may have been willing to extend its
business in Hungary for purely political motives: because Austria wanted
it and because the Bank could not afford to upset the master. On the
other hand, increasing its activity in Hungary might have turned out to
be a lucrative job. Before more work is done, we can conservatively remark
that we do not know that the Bank became less profitable after it extended
its activity in Hungary. Keeping Austria and Hungary together might have
been a rewarding business. The conclusion would be that central banks are
powerful political/bureaucratic actors in monetary unions. Because they may
benefit from expanding their size, they are concerned with supporting the
union and thus tend to transform themselves, over time, into a tool for
redistribution.
To conclude, we should note that the evidence on the monetary aspects
of the Habsburg union reported here reinforces earlier suggestions (Komlos
b) that the Habsburg union was a good deal for Hungary, in blatant
contrast with the conventional views on the matter. Recast in terms of the
classic debate on ‘centrifugal’ vs. ‘centripetal’ forces in the pre-World War I
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, this article’s main finding is that strong co-
operative forces were at work in the period under study, as evidenced by the
ability to strike a series of monetary deals and by the failure of the secessionist
project. The eventual break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was by no
means ‘written on the wall’.
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Data appendix
Several series used in the article were collected and constructed from archival or
scattered sources, and are provided for reference. The specific financial organisation
of the Habsburg monarchy identified, aside from each country’s ‘special budget’, a
‘common budget’ that was essentially a transfer system, bound to be in equilibrium
each year. This required a number of transformations of the primary data in order
to identify proper ‘Austrian’ and ‘Hungarian’ accounts. First, gross interest service
numbers needed to be corrected since Austria assumed the service of pre-
debts, but received an annual contribution from Hungary. Hungary’s contribution
to Austria needed to be added to Hungary’s official interest service but subtracted
from Austria’s. Revenues were constructed using the rule that defined the breakdown
of ‘common resources’ (the income from customs). The yields are the return on
Austrian and Hungarian % Gold Bonds in Paris, from Le Rentier. Using other
markets (such as London, Berlin or Vienna) to compute yields gives identical results.
Population is from Cre´dit lyonnais archives.
Table A. contains data on Austro-Hungarian Bank’s (AHB) holdings of
commercial bills (discounts) at the end of each year. The source is the official
reports of the Austro-Hungarian Bank.
Table A. gives the average maturity of commercial bills held by the Austro-
Hungarian bank, depending on where these bills were discounted (this definition
should not be mixed up with a breakdown of bills according to where they are
payable. Since it often happened that bills discounted in Austria originated in
Hungary, while the opposite was much less frequent (owing to the importance of
the Austrian banking system at large for Hungary), the numbers reported here and
in the text underestimate the extent of the actual support of the AHB to Hungary.
This, of course, only strengthens our point.
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Table A. Macroeconomic statistics (millions of florins unless
otherwise stated).
Austrian Hungarian Gold Bonds Gold Bonds Population Population
Interest Interest Austrian Hungarian Yields Yields Austria Hungary
Service Service Revenue Revenue Austria (%) Hung. (%) (in ) (in )
 .    na na , ,
 .    na na , ,
 .    na na , ,
 .    na na , ,
 .    na na , ,
     . na , ,
 .    . na , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
     . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
     . . , ,
     . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
     . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
     . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 . .   . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 . .   . . , ,
 .    . . , ,
 . .   . . , ,
   ,  . . , ,
 .  ,  . . , ,
 .  ,  . . , ,
 .  ,  . . , ,
 .  ,  . . , ,
 . . ,  . . , ,
Source: Constructed from information in the Cre´dit lyonnais archives and the Statesman’s
Yearbooks.
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Table A. Portfolio of commercial bills outstanding, at  December of
each year (florins).
Vienna Austr. branches Budapest Hun. branches
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
 ,, ,, ,, ,,
Source: Annual Reports of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, National Library, Vienna.
Monetary bargaining in Austria-Hungary – 
Table A. Average maturity of bills: number of days.
Vienna Austrian Budapest Hungarian Bosnia- Total
branches branches Herc.
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
      
      
      
Source: Annual Reports of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, National Library, Vienna.
